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AREN’T I A WOMAN? DECONSTRUCTING SEX 
DISCRIMINATION AND FREEING TRANSGENDER WOMEN 
FROM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
Faroat Andasheva∗ 
 
That man over there says women need to be helped into carriages, and 
lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever 
helps me into carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place! 
And ain’t I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! I have ploughed, and 
planted, and gathered into barns, and no man could head me! And ain’t I 
woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man—when I could get 
it—and bear the lash as well! And ain’t I a woman? I have borne thirteen 
children, and seen them most all sold off to slavery, and when I cried out 
with my mother’s grief, none but Jesus heard me! And ain’t I a woman? 




In 2014, an estimated 1.5 million Americans were incarcerated in state 
and federal correctional facilities.2 While the disproportionate presence of 
black and Latino people in American prisons is widely known,3 transgender 
individuals are another group that face stark disparities.4 Nearly 16% of all 
transgender people are incarcerated at some time in their lives and the 
number of black transgender individuals represents closer to half of their 
 
∗ J.D. candidate, Florida International University College of Law, 2017; B.S., Shepherd University, 
2014.  I would like to thank my friends and family for their unconditional support and encouragement.  I 
would also like to thank Professor Michele Anglade for her support throughout the writing process.  
Finally, a special thanks to the editors of the FIU LAW REVIEW for publishing my Comment and to 
Gisselle Perez for carrying out my vision throughout the editing process. This Comment was written 
with the utmost respect towards the transgender community and I have conducted extensive research for 
proper terminology. Offensive language, if any, is not intentional and all errors that remain are my sole 
responsibility. 
1  PATRICIA C. MCKISSACK & FREDRICK L. MCKISSACK, SOJOURNER TRUTH: AIN’T I A WOMAN? 
(1992). 
2 Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1 (Dep’t of Justice, 2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14 
.pdf. 
3  Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
4  NCTE, Chapter 13: Reducing Incarceration and Ending Abuse in Persons, A BLUEPRINT FOR 
EQUALITY: FEDERAL AGENDA FOR TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, http://www.transequality.org/sites/default 
/files/docs/resources/NCTE_Blueprint_2015_Prisons.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
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entire population.5 While life in prison is not glamorous by any means and 
is often accompanied with violence, transgender individuals face other 
unique challenges and suffer from abuse from both inmates and correctional 
staff at higher rates.6 For example, transgender inmates are sexually 
assaulted at higher rates compared to their non-transgender counterparts.7 
Research on violence in California correctional facilities revealed that 59% 
of transgender inmates reported having been sexually assaulted in a 
California correctional facility in contrast to 4.4% of the random sample of 
inmates.8 
Mirroring a diverse and changing American population, correctional 
facilities find themselves facing the realities of incarcerating transgender 
(“trans”) women—biological males that present or identify as women—in 
male prisons.  Critics often laud “Orange is the New Black,” a hit Netflix 
original series for the creation of Sophia Burset, a transsexual woman 
incarcerated along with other female prisoners.9 However, Sophia is a 
unique case because only trans women who underwent sex-reassignment 
surgery are placed into prisons that match their genitalia.10 Trans women 
who choose not to go through sex-reassignment surgery, or are unable to do 
so because of economic reasons, are almost always placed in male prisons. 
There, an alarming number of them suffer through sexual and physical 
abuse, both from other inmates and correctional staff, as well as improper 
medical care and emotional distress.11 
However, one thing that “Orange is the New Black” did get right is the 
oft inability of prison authorities to deal with transgender inmates when it 
comes to their safety.12 At one point in the show, Sophia suffered from 
repeated verbal abuse from female inmates due to her transsexuality, which 
later escalated into a fight.13 The fictional warden dealt with the situation 
similar to how correctional authorities do in real life—Sophia was placed 
into solitary confinement for her own protection and her attackers went 
 
5  Id. 
6  Lori Sexton, Valerie Jenness & Jennifer Macy Sumner, Where the Margins Meet: A 
Demographic Assessment of Transgender Inmates in Men’s Prisons, 27:6, 835–66, JUSTICE QUARTERLY 
(2009). 
7  Id. at 837. 
8  Id. 
9  Orange is the New Black: I Wasn’t Ready (Netflix Series July 13, 2013). 
10  See generally Sydney Tarzwell, Note, The Gender Lines are Marked with Razor Wire: 
Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender Prisoners, 38 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167 (2006). 
11  Id. at 169. 
12  Orange is the New Black: Don’t Make Me Come Back There (Netflix Series June 11, 2015). 
13  Id. 
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unpunished.14 More often than not, trans women are placed in solitary 
confinement or administrative segregation for protection from the rest of the 
inmate population.15 This policy becomes more problematic because an 
alarming amount of prisons automatically place trans women into 
segregation without assessing their needs or an incident that would warrant 
segregation for safety purposes.16 As a result, trans women spend an 
indefinite amount of time, or even the entirety of their sentence, in isolation 
solely due to their status as transgender.17 
In the past, all lawsuits brought under federal anti-discrimination laws 
were unsuccessful because the courts refused to read the word “sex” as 
encompassing more than traditional notions of male and female.18 Lawsuits 
brought by transgender inmates under the Equal Protection Clause, in 
regards to their placement into segregation or need for medical treatment, 
have been unsuccessful because jurisdictions across the country do not 
consider transgender individuals to be a protected class.19  Thus, their 
claims were viewed under rational basis review.  Under this standard, the 
courts found that placing transgender individuals into solitary confinement 
was rationally related to the legitimate purposes of ensuring safety of the 
prison population.20 
However, the approach the courts took towards transgender 
discrimination claims changed after the Supreme Court’s decision in an 
employment discrimination case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.21 There, the 
Supreme Court ruled that negative comments about the plaintiff’s lack of 
femininity were a motivating factor in passing her over for a promotion and 
constituted sex discrimination based on gender stereotypes.22 The holding 
that discrimination based on gender stereotype is sex-based discrimination 
changed the way courts look at sex discrimination.23 Since then, circuit 
courts throughout the country have applied the reasoning in Price 
Waterhouse to cases across all areas of law. The courts found that 
discrimination against transgender individuals is sex discrimination because 
 
14  Id. 
15  Tarzwell, supra note 10, at 180. 
16  Id. at 194. 
17  Id. at 171. 
18  See generally Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F. 2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Ulane v. E. 
Airlines, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
19  Holloway, 566 F. 2d at 667. 
20  See Lopez v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. (NRB) 10321, 2009 WL 229956 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
30, 2009); Kaeo-Tomaselli v. Butts, No. 11-00670 LEK/BMK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13280 (D. Haw. 
Jan. 31, 2013). 
21  See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
22  Id. at 268. 
23  Id. 
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they did not conform to sex stereotypes by expressing appearance and 
mannerisms inconsistent with their biological sex.24 However, successful 
transgender discrimination cases under Price Waterhouse prevailed because 
the courts held that plaintiffs were discriminated against due to their 
“gender non-conforming” appearance, rather than their transgender 
identity.25 
However, this popular judicial interpretation of Price Waterhouse 
forces plaintiffs to file claims as a man or a woman whose appearance does 
not match his or her biological sex and totally disregards the desires of 
plaintiffs to get justice for expressing their gender identity.  The federal 
district court in Schroer v. Billington recognized the problematic framework 
of Price Waterhouse as applied to transgender individuals and proposed an 
approach of treating discrimination against transgender individuals as sex 
discrimination per se.26 The court reasoned that transgender individuals 
were discriminated against due to the perpetrator’s intolerance towards 
people whose gender identity did not match their anatomical sex rather than 
failure to conform to sex stereotypes.27 Despite Schroer’s progressive 
holding, courts throughout the country continue to apply the Price 
Waterhouse reasoning when dealing with transgender discrimination.28 
However, application of Price Waterhouse to transgender discrimination 
cases is harmful because its framework inherently misunderstands the 
biological and sociological reality of transgenderism and further perpetrates 
cissexist gender binary system of our society. Expanding on Schroer’s 
holding that transgender discrimination is sex discrimination and 
deconstructing the notion that sex is only male and female will lead to a 
framework that protects trans and other non-gender conforming individuals 
from sex discrimination. To be clear, the argument here is not that trans 
women have a constitutional right to live among the general inmate 
population. Rather, courts must recognize transgender discrimination as 
discrimination against transgender people and not as against men or women 
who fail to conform to stereotypes of their biological sex. Doing so will 
give transgender individuals their day in court under an appropriate 
framework that does not “misconstrue their existence. Expanding “sex” 
discrimination beyond the dichotomous “male” and “female” would allow 
courts to analyze claims challenging placement of trans women into 
isolation under heightened scrutiny to determine whether discriminatory 
 
24  See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F. 3d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 2004); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F. 3d 
1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
25  Smith, 378 F. 3d at 573. 
26  See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006). 
27  Id. 
28  Glenn, 663 F. 3d at 1318; Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1111. 
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segregation practices further an important government interest in a way that 
is substantially related to that interest. In the words of Justice O’Connor, 
“[t]he purpose of requiring [intermediate scrutiny] is to assure that the 
validity of a [gender-based] classification is determined through reasoned 
analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often 
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.”29 
Part I of this Note will provide the history, science, and sociology 
behind transgenderism, as well as information on the exact nature of the 
struggles that trans women face in male prisons and the realities of solitary 
confinement.  Part I will also discuss approaches and policies of various 
jurisdictions towards transgender inmates. Furthermore, it will provide the 
standard of judicial review for transgender discrimination cases in the 
United States prior to Price Waterhouse and offer rationale for recognizing 
transgender individuals as a protected class subject to intermediate scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection clause. Part II will discuss Price Waterhouse 
and the way it affects transgender discrimination litigation across the 
country and argue why it should not remain the dominant framework used 
by courts to extend rights to transgender individuals.  Furthermore, Part II 
will also analyze the split that followed the decision in Schroer to determine 
whether expansion of Judge Robertson’s treatment of transgender 
discrimination as sex discrimination per se provides a successful framework 
for Equal Protection litigation. Part III will provide recommendations for 
eliminating narrow sex and gender constructs in the legal world, as well as 
safe and sensible options for housing transgender inmates that do not 
include protective custody or placement into the general population 
opposite of their self-identity. 
Ultimately, this Note concludes that Price Waterhouse inherently 
misunderstands the nature of transgenderism because its logic does not 
apply equally, or at all, to those who identify as transgender, and it does not 
challenge the existence of the socially-imposed binary sex/gender system.  
While the logic in Schroer does not remedy the issue, following Judge 
Robertson’s path of recognizing the complexities of sex and gender, and 
treating transgender discrimination as sex discrimination, will enable male-
to-female (MTF) inmates to challenge their placement in solitary 






29  Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982). 
30  See Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212–13. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
Bending Gender: Understanding Transgenderism 
 
Laymen, as well as many legal professionals, use the terms “gender” 
and “sex” interchangeably.  Yet, it is important to distinguish the two.  The 
term “sex” refers to a person’s biology, which, contrary to popular belief, 
extends beyond male and female.31 “Intersex” is a general term used to 
describe individuals born with sexual anatomy that is neither fully female 
nor male.32  For example, a child is intersex if born with typical female 
genitalia and internal testes.33 Some individuals are born with XY 
chromosomes, yet retain a typical female body.34 Additionally, there are 
“sex” chromosomes beyond the widely known XX and XY, such as XXY.35 
Some children are born with an enlarged clitoris and a shallow or absent 
vagina or a small penis and an opening in the scrotum that may resemble a 
vagina.36 When faced with ambiguous genitalia, doctors, not nature, decide 
the sex of the child, oftentimes followed by an early genital-normalizing 
surgery.37 The child grows up with the assigned sex and gender identity, 
often unaware of his or her condition.38  As a result, some intersex children 
will later reject their assigned gender.39 Understanding that sex does not 
exist in “black and white” is vital when considering claims of sex 
discrimination because despite not being as diverse as gender, “sex” should 
be read beyond male and female and grant protection to those that fall in 
between. 
The term “gender” refers to characteristics culturally associated with a 
person’s biological sex.40  “Gender identity” refers to a person’s 
“internal . . . sense of being either male or female, or something other or in 
between.”41  Gender identity is an internal experience not visible to others.42 
 
31 INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, What is Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_ 
intersex (last visited Oct. 26, 2016). 
32  Id. 
33  Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex 
Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 63 (2006). 
34  Id. 
35  Id. at 63–64. 
36  Id. at 63. 
37  Id. at 66. 
38  Id. at 65. 
39  Tamar-Mattis, supra note 33, at 74–75. 
40  JAMISON GREEN, Introduction to Transgender Issues, in TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A 
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 1, 2 (2012). 
41  Id. at 3. 
42  Id. 
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In contrast, a person’s “gender expression” is readily observed by others 
and consists of socially defined characteristics and behaviors associated 
with masculinity or femininity.43 A person’s gender expression may or may 
not be consistent with socially prescribed gender roles and is not always 
reflective of a person’s gender identity.44 
For most people, their gender identity is congruent with the sex 
assigned at birth (i.e., a person born with a female body has a female gender 
identity). However, some individuals do not experience congruency 
between their gender identity and expression and their physical traits.  
People who experience this have been called “transgender.”45 Persons 
included under the “transgender umbrella” are those that are labeled: pre-
operative, post-operative, and non-operative transsexuals, cross-dressers, 
intersexed individuals, androgynous men and women, and genderqueer 
people.46 Other words for transgender include “gender variant,” “gender 
different,” and “gender non-conforming.”47 
While there are numerous identities that fall within the transgender 
spectrum, transgender individuals may be divided into three categories.  On 
one end of the spectrum, there are “transsexuals,” individuals with gender 
identity opposite to their biological sex.48 Until recently, transsexualism 
was classified as a “gender identity disorder” (“GID”).49  However, the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition 
(DSM-V) renamed GID to “gender dysphoria” and moved it out of the 
sexual disorders category into a category of its own.50 Now, “gender 
dysphoria” is a diagnosis used by mental health professionals to describe 
people who experience significant distress with the sex and gender they 
were assigned at birth.51  The name change and declassification of GID as a 
pathological disorder helps deconstruct the binary notions of gender where 
identities outside of masculine and feminine are deemed abnormal.52 In 
addition, DSM-V recognizes that the distress component of gender 
dysphoria results from ostracism and discrimination suffered by transgender 
 
43  Id. at 3. 
44  Id. at 3–4. 
45  Id. at 4–5. 
46  GREEN, supra note 40, at 3. 
47  Id. at 4. 
48  Male-to-female transsexuals (“MTF”) are biological males who identify as females. Female-
to-male transsexuals (“FTM”) are biological females who identify as males. 
49  See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000). 
50  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
451 (5th ed. 2013). 
51  Id. 
52  Id. at 814. 
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individuals and is not an inherent part of transgender identity.53 Many, but 
not all, transsexuals seek hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery to 
align their physical characteristics with their gender identity. 
In the middle of the trans people spectrum are “transgender” 
individuals, whose appearance, personal characteristics, or behaviors fall 
outside the traditional notions of male and female.54 The term “transgender” 
attempts to encompass a broader range of gender non-conforming people 
than the term “transsexual” and thus includes non-operative transsexuals, 
cross-dressers, drag queens, intersex people, and genderqueer people.55 
At the opposite end of the spectrum from transsexuals are “gender-
variant people,” also known as gender non-conforming individuals such as 
androgynous men and women.56  Those individuals still identify with their 
biological sex, but are perceived to be “masculine women” and “feminine 
men,” thus still suffering stigma and discrimination for failure to conform 
to societal stereotypes.57 
 
Me, Myself, and I: Overview of Solitary Confinement 
 
Solitary confinement is a condition of “extreme isolation and 
deprivation” that has been used by prison administrators since the 1600s.58  
While solitary confinement is imposed on inmates for a variety of reasons, 
including rehabilitation and protection, many prison administrators view the 
practice as an effective way to maintain order and discipline inside their 
prisons.59  The rationale behind the effectiveness of solitary confinement is 
rooted in a human predisposition to seek out companionship.60  Once in 
prison, inmates lose many basic privileges available to an average person.61  
Because human contact is one of the very few privileges inmates retain in 
prisons, prison administrators reason that inmates feel compelled to follow 
prison rules and standards when faced with the risk of losing that 
privilege.62  Inmates’ fear of solitary confinement is understandable, for the 
devastating effect of solitary confinement on the human psyche and body is 
 
53  Id. at 458. 
54  See GREEN, supra note 40, at 4. 
55  Id. at 3. 
56  Id. at 4. 
57  Id. 
58  Tracy Hresko, In the Cellars of the Hollow Men: Use of Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons 
and its Implications Under International Laws Against Torture, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 4 (2006). 
59  Id. at 2. 
60  Id. 
61  See id. at 3. 
62  See id. 
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well-documented.63  While incarceration in itself is isolating and harmful to 
human social development, solitary confinement features components that 
make general incarceration look like a stay in the Hamptons.  Solitary 
confinement cells are designed to allow minimal human contact, often 
being the size of an average bathroom with solid steel doors and devoid of 
personal possessions, books, and windows.64 Inmates in solitary 
confinement spend an entire day alone, with an hour or two reserved for 
showering or recreational activities, both still done in isolation.65  Those 
inmates are also denied educational and vocational opportunities offered to 
inmates in most prisons.66  They are prohibited from watching television, 
listening to radio, or reading newspapers and books.67 Inmates in isolation 
experience “extreme anxiety, hallucinations, violent fantasies, 
hypersensitivity to external stimuli, and increased tendency to inflict self-
harm.”68 
With no federal laws regulating the use of solitary confinement, prison 
administrators exercise a wide range of discretion in determining when and 
for how long an inmate is isolated.69 The decisions and policies of 
correctional authorities also enjoy much deference from the judicial branch, 
which makes it extremely difficult for inmates placed in solitary 
confinement to successfully challenge their confinement under 
constitutional standards.70 
 
Solitary Confinement and Transgender Women 
 
Non-gender conforming and transgender individuals are more likely 
than others to be put into protective custody or solitary confinement.71  In 
some instances, MTF inmates request to be segregated. Given the 
discussion above about the horrors of solitary confinement, one can imagine 
how serious the circumstances must be to lead to such requests.72 The 
requests usually stem from fear of being violated and belief that isolation 
will protect them. 
 
63  See id. 
64 Hresko, supra note 58, at 3. 
65  See id. at 4–5. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. at 7. 
69  Id. at 10. 
70 Hresko, supra note 58, at 10. 
71 Gabriel Akers, Safety and Solidarity Across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation of 
Transgender People in Detention, 9 DUKEMNIRIER AWARDS 343, 372. 
72  Id. at 372. 
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However, some transgender people are placed into solitary 
confinement against their will, for their own alleged safety. Some prisons 
have policies that dictate that victims of violent attacks must be placed in 
involuntary protective custody.73 These policies, helpful at a glance, do 
nothing more than punish victims of violence and deter them from reporting 
instances of abuse and violence they experience. Such policies have a 
disproportionate impact on transgender intimates, especially MTF 
individuals in male prisons.74 Ostracism felt by transgender individuals in 
daily life is intensified in male prisons due to their hyper-masculinized 
environments,75 where men are denied dominance and power, traits 
associated with masculinity. There, they are stripped of their identity, given 
a number, and must depend on prison authorities for the provision of their 
most basic needs. As a result, prisoners turn to the one thing that has been 
used throughout centuries to establish dominance and exert power—sexual 
violence.76 In such settings with rigid gender roles and constant need to 
assert dominance, prisoners displaying “feminine” traits are more likely to 
be victimized.77 However, rather than developing effective policies aimed at 
assigning transgender individuals to prisons that match their gender identity 
and/or appearance, many prison authorities give MTF inmates a choice to 
enter into administrative segregation or force them into it automatically.78 
Aside from being punished for being victims of violence, transgender 
individuals are often targeted and disciplined for possessing make-up 
products, female or male underwear, and clothing. On top of being 
disciplined for their failure to conform to the required dress code, 
transgender inmates are often targeted and written up for minor infractions 
that land them in solitary confinement simply because of the prison staff’s 
prejudice.79 
 
Housing and Management of Transgender Inmates Across Various    
Jurisdictions 
 
An empirical study done by Sydney Tarzwell analyzed prison and jail 
practices and policies in regards to trans inmates in forty-four states.80 Only 
 
73  Id. at 374. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  Tarzwell, supra 10, at 172. 
77  Jordan Mintz, Treatment of Transgender Inmates—The Double punishment, SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1 (2013). 
78  Id. at 10. 
79  Akers, supra note 71, at 374. 
80  Tarzwell, supra note 10, at 180. 
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seven states81 had policies aimed at assessing and managing transgender 
inmates.82 However, the content of the written policies in those seven states 
are lackluster when it comes to providing sensitive, inclusive, and safe 
placement options for trans inmates.83 One common theme among the 
written policies of the seven states is the narrowly defined group of 
transgender inmates that are covered by those policies.84 The policies 
largely target only inmates who are diagnosed with GID and do not take 
into consideration genderqueer and non-gender conforming inmates.85 
Furthermore, those policies often take away their freedom to self-identify 
and have medical and prison staff determine who is covered by the policies 
and where they should be placed.86 The very use of the word “freedom” 
may seem ironic in a prison setting, but transgender individuals have been 
forced into assigned sex and gender expectations from birth and their very 
existence is an act of rebellion against the binary sex and gender system in 
our society.  Taking away their ability to self-identify only silences them 
further. 
Most of the states analyzed did not have any written policies. For 
example, Arkansas does not have any written policies aimed at managing 
transgender prisoners and is strictly genitalia-based.87  An individual who 
starts transitioning by hormone treatment or top surgery, but still has a penis 
will be placed in a male prison.88  Furthermore, due to increased awareness 
of sexual violence through the Prison Rape Elimination Act, a prisoner who 
appears transgender to prison staff will be automatically placed into 
administrative segregation.89 
Some states place MTF inmates into general population unless an 
incident arises that would justify their placement into protective custody.90  
This practice is toxic because rather than developing policies to assess the 
needs and vulnerabilities of transgender inmates at the intake level, prison 
authorities are gambling with the inmates’ safety and risking their well-
being by waiting for them to be victimized.91 
Currently, the city of Denver has developed a transgender jail policy 
 
81  The states with written policies in regards to transgender prisoners are Alabama, Colorado, 
Pennsylvania, Idaho, Minnesota, and Michigan. Id. at 198–203. 
82  Id. at 195. 
83  See generally id. at 195–203. 
84  Id. at 198–204. 
85  Id. 
86  Tarzwell, supra note 10, at 203. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at 204. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 193. 
91  Id. 
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that is effective and should be used as a national model. It allows detainees 
to self-identify and indicate their housing preference.92 The policy strives to 
better the relationship and understanding between the detainees and the 
prison staff.93  At the intake level, transgender inmates have a choice to fill 
out “a statement of preference form, including a preferred name and 
preferred pronouns, regardless of legal name change or whether they’ve 
undergone gender-reassignment surgery.”94  After booking, such inmates 
are then placed into segregation for seventy-two hours while a “transgender 
review board” recommends where to assign the inmate.95 Unlike review and 
committee boards of states with written policies, the Denver board takes 
into consideration “psychological factors that may contribute to either the 
individual’s resiliency or vulnerability,” and allows the inmate to refuse an 
anatomy check.96 Furthermore, the board is allowed to consult with a 
transgender individual or an informed ally to make the best possible 
decision and recommendation for housing.97  However, the required 
inclusion of transgender activists and allies on the board would be 
preferable to mere freedom to consult them when needed.  Active 
involvement of the transgender community on the board will make it less 
likely that recommendations and housing assignments will be done out of 
ignorance and bias. 
Denver’s sensible policy respects the gender identities of trans inmates 
and their privacy by allowing them to take private showers, request to be 
housed with other trans inmates, and request a male or female guard to 
perform strip searches.98  Furthermore, Denver jail authorities did not stop 
at written policies, but incorporated sensitivity training for the jail 
employees and taught them the importance of gender identity and proper 
vocabulary when addressing inmates.99 
While Denver jail authorities take requests of the inmates into 
consideration, certain criminal activities automatically deny requests of 
MTF inmates to be placed into female housing.100  For example, an MTF 
inmate with male genitalia and a criminal history that includes crimes of a 
 
92  Jennifer Brown, Denver Jail Transgender Policy a National Model, DENVER POST (June 27, 
2015, 1:42 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_28395500/denver-jail-transgender-policy-
national-model. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  Transgender and Gender-Variant Inmates Department Order 4005.1, DENVER SHERIFF DEP’T 
(June 6, 2012), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/026337.pdf. 
97  Id. 
98  See Brown, supra note 92. 
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
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sexual nature cannot be assigned to female housing for safety purposes.101 
It is important to acknowledge that even though Denver has such a 
policy in place, many MTF inmates still request to be housed in male 
units.102  This can be explained by the fact that many inmates are 
recidivists—coming back to a familiar prison where you are acquainted 
with the hierarchy and internal rules is easier than being thrust into an 
essentially unfamiliar environment of female prisons.103 
 
Tried and False Methods 
 
While cases featuring transgender litigants challenging housing 
assignments and the use of solitary confinement are few, many of those 
cases have been litigated under the Eighth Amendment but with no concrete 
luck.104 As a general rule, the standard to hold prison authorities liable 
under the Eighth Amendment is deliberate indifference to excessive risks to 
the health or safety of prisoners.105  “Serious deprivations of basic human 
needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, reasonable safety, 
warmth, exercise, hygiene, and sleep, can constitute violations of the Eighth 
Amendment.”106  Yet, even such serious deprivations might be found 
permissible if accompanied by adequate disciplinary justifications. The fact 
that the courts’ do not view solitary confinement as cruel and unusual 
punishment substantially limits using the Eighth Amendment to challenge a 
transgender inmate’s involuntary placement into isolation. 
In Meriwether v. Faulker, a transgender woman challenged her 
placement into administrative segregation, which could have lasted well 
into the remaining thirty-years of her prison sentence.107  Meriwether 
argued that placement into administrative segregation denied her the 
benefits enjoyed by other inmates, such as adequate living space, recreation, 
and educational and occupational opportunities.108  While the Seventh 
Circuit did not find any merit to Meriwether’s due process claim because 
lockdown restrictions do not implicate a liberty interest, the court 
entertained the possibility of an Eighth Amendment violation.  The Seventh 
Circuit found that the district court erred in dismissing Meriwether’s claim 
 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Nikko Harada, Trans-Literacy Within Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: De/Fusing Gender 
and Sex, 36 N.M.L. REV. 627, 633–38 (2006). 
105  Akers, supra note 71, at 375. 
106  Id. at 376. 
107  Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F. 2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987). 
108  Id. at 416. 
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as a matter of law and remanded the case to ascertain actual conditions of 
Meriwether’s confinement and any feasible alternatives.109  However, the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis of Meriwether’s Eighth Amendment claim 
expressed some skepticism with regard to deliberate indifference by the 
prison authorities towards the inmate.110  Meriwether alleged that she 
suffered several assaults at the hands of the staff and other inmates in both 
general population and segregation.111 The court noted that “[p]laintiff’s 
claim that the defendants have deliberately failed to protect her from sexual 
assault is somewhat in conflict with her desire not to remain in 
administrative segregation indefinitely.”112  It is disturbing that the Seventh 
Circuit viewed Meriwether’s desire to be free from sexual assault as 
conflicting with the desire to be free from solitary confinement, especially 
in light of allegations that both inmates and staff were the perpetrators. 
Very few courts considered Equal Protection implications underlying 
the policies that place transgender inmates into solitary confinement.113  In 
Tates v. Blanas, a transgender woman challenged Sacramento County Jail’s 
policy of placing all transgender detainees in total separation (T-Sep) 
throughout their entire jail sentence.114  Defendant prison officials argued 
that all transgender detainees were placed in T-Sep solely because they 
were transgender and the defendants were afraid that if the detainees were 
assigned to general population or less restrictive separation, they might be 
harmed and the defendants would be held liable.115  Despite initially 
assuming that the policy was an appropriate means of securing the safety of 
detainees, the court conducted a genuine analysis of the situation in light of 
the additional evidence.116 What changed the court’s mind to make them 
look more closely? 
First, the court reviewed differences between T-Sep inmates and the 
general population and found that T-Sep detainees are deprived of many 
benefits available to other inmates.117 For example, T-Sep detainees had to 
be shackled during transport, were prohibited from group worship or 
religious services, and were not allowed any communication with other 
 
109  Id. at 417. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  See Medina-Tejada v. Sacramento Cty., No. CIV. S-04-138, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7331 
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2006); Tates v. Blanas, No. CIV S-00-2539 OMP P, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26029 
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003). 
114  Tates, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26029, at *1. 
115  Id. at *9. 
116  Id. at *12. 
117  See id. at *11–*22. 
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inmates.118  Furthermore, they were provided rooms less sanitary than those 
available to other inmates with no means to keep them clean and had 
limited access to showers, phones, and recreational rooms.119 The court also 
discussed other forms of discriminatory treatment, stemming directly from 
Tates’ gender identity, such as denying Tates’ access to female 
undergarments, sexual assault, and verbal harassment.120 
Without explicitly calling attention to it, the court conducted “an Equal 
Protection analysis by comparing treatment of transgender inmates with the 
treatment of similarly situated non-transgender detainees.”121  Ultimately, 
the court ruled against the defendants and ordered them to create a new 
classification scheme that would not discriminate against transgender 
detainees.122  The court held that the defendants may not deprive 
transgender detainees of benefits enjoyed by others simply because of bias 
against transgender individuals.123  The court further noted in dicta that 
segregation of transgender inmates is not always required and that the duty 
to protect transgender detainees from harm may not be used to justify 
actions not reasonably related to accomplishing that purpose.124 
However, Tates’ stands alone in its decision. Other claims brought 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were 
unsuccessful because they were reviewed under rational basis, as 
transgender individuals are not recognized as a suspect class, entitled to 
heightened review.125  Prison officials easily meet the standard of 
“rationally related to a legitimate government interest” by alleging that 
putting MTF inmates in the general population would pose a significant 
threat to security in general, and to the MTF inmate specifically.126 
As discussed above, placing transgender inmates into administrative 
segregation or solitary confinement does not protect them from private 
abuse at the hands of the prison staff.  Furthermore, the psychological 
effects of isolation, inadequate hygiene and living conditions, and the 
deprivation of basic human contact and amenities available to other 
prisoners hardly rationalizes a government interest that is not as legitimate 
as it may seem. 
 
118  Id. at *18. 
119  Id. at *15,*16,*20,*21. 
120  See Tates v. Blanas, No. CIV S-00-2539 OMP P, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26029 (E.D. Cal. 
Mar. 6, 2003), at *15,*16,*20,*21. 
121  Akers, supra note 71, at 382. 
122  Tates, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26029, at *28–*29. 
123  Id. at *27. 
124  Id. at *27–*28. 
125  See, e.g., DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Wyo. 2004); Lopez v. 
City of New York, No. 05 Civ. (NRB) 10321, 2009 WL 229956, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009). 
126  See Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., 473 F. 3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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Transgender Discrimination Jurisprudence 
 
Pre-Price Waterhouse Transgender Discrimination Claims 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
courts throughout the country refused to recognize transgender 
discrimination under the “sex discrimination” framework of the Equal 
Protection clause, Title VII, or other similar anti-discrimination laws 
because the term “sex” did not extend to cover gender discrimination. 
In Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., which set the precedent for 
other similar decisions across various jurisdictions, the Ninth Circuit found 
that transsexuals were not a suspect class for Equal Protection purposes 
because they did not make up a “discrete and insular minority,” nor did they 
possess “immutable characteristics determined solely by the accident of 
birth.”127  The Ninth circuit did not engage in the statutory interpretation 
analysis of “sex” of Title VII, satisfied with its finding that Congress has 
not shown any intent other than to limit the term “sex” to its traditional 
meaning.128  The court reasoned that should the appellant claim 
discrimination because of her sex, she would have a cause of action under 
Title VII, but the appellant in Holloway made a voluntary choice to alter her 
birth sex, an act not protected under Title VII.129 
Some courts held more specifically that “sex” refers to biological or 
anatomical characteristics, “whereas the term ‘gender’ refers to an 
individual’s sexual identity” or socially-constructed characteristics.130  
These early transgender discrimination cases demonstrated that transgender 
individuals were denied protection because they were victims of “gender,” 
rather than “sex” and somehow courts found it to be permissible.131  
Transgender activists and allies needed to find a way for courts to consider 
gender discrimination before transgender individuals could be protected by 
the law as a suspect class.  The solution came in the form of Price 





127  Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F. 2d 659, 659 (9th Cir. 1977). 
128  Id. at 663. 
129  Id. at 664. 
130  See Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993); 
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984). 
131  See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).  
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The Price Waterhouse plaintiff, Ann Hopkins (“Hopkins”), was a 
female associate and a contender for a partnership at the firm, for which she 
was not selected.132 Despite Hopkins’ qualifications, the alleged reason was 
her “aggressiveness” and lack of interpersonal skills.133 However, the 
Supreme Court detected undertones of sexism in the comments of her 
evaluators, who described Hopkins as “macho” and stated that she 
“overcompensated for being a woman.”134  Hopkins’ male evaluator 
advised that she could improve her chances of partnership at the firm if she 
were to take “a course at charm school,” “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry.”135  The Court found those comments to play into the existing 
gender stereotypes of how a woman should act and as part of the motive 
behind passing Hopkins over for a partnership at the firm.136 If gender is 
just one of the motivating factors behind a decision negatively affecting an 
employee, it constitutes actionable discrimination.137 In the ruling for 
Hopkins, the Court held that Title VII reaches claims of sex discrimination 
based on “sex stereotyping,” a notion unheard of in the past.138 
 
Price Waterhouse Aftereffect 
 
In light of Price Waterhouse, circuit courts across the country applied 
the gender discrimination framework set out in Price Waterhouse to grant 
protection to transgender individuals. The Ninth Circuit in Schwenk v. 
Hartford overturned the precedent set out in Holloway.139 Schwenk, a pre-
operative MTF transsexual, was assigned to a male prison where Robert 
Mitchell (“Mitchell”) was employed as a guard.140  Schwenk’s alleged that 
there were several instances of Mitchell subjugating her to unwanted sexual 
advances and harassment, which escalated to sexual assault.141 Schwenk 
 
132  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989). 
133  Id. at 234. 
134  Id. at 235. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. at 236. 
137  Id. at 240. 
138  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
139  Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F. 3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000). 
140  Id. at 1189. 
141  Id. 
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sought damages for suffering a psychological injury resulting from 
Mitchell’s attempted rape under Gender Motivated Violence Act 
(“GMVA”).142  Mitchell argued that even if GMVA applied to men, it did 
not apply to transsexuals because transsexuality is not an element of gender 
but a psychiatric illness.143 The court disagreed, finding that GMVA 
parallels Title VII by both statutes prohibiting discrimination based on sex 
and gender.144 
The Ninth Circuit then applied the framework set out in Price 
Waterhouse, which dictated that gender did not need to be the motivating 
factor behind discrimination, but only a part of it.145  The court directly 
relied on Price Waterhouse to establish that Mitchell’s actions were 
motivated, at least partially, by Schwenk’s feminine gender expression, 
since he did not begin harassing Schwenk until he discovered her 
transsexuality.146 
In Smith v. City of Salem, appellant Smith was employed by Salem’s 
Fire Department for seven years before she was diagnosed with GID.147 In 
accordance with medical protocol that required an individual with GID to 
present and live full-time under their gender identity, Smith began 
expressing her female identity in daily life, including her workplace.148  
Faced with comments from her co-workers about her “not masculine 
enough” appearance, Smith informed her supervisor about her GID 
diagnosis, designed treatment, and Smith’s eventual complete transition 
from male to female.149  Smith then alleged that her supervisor and other 
superiors conspired to fire her based on her transsexualism.150 
On review, the Sixth Circuit of Appeals reversed the district court’s 
dismissal, finding that precedent set out in Holloway, Ulane, and others 
“has been eviscerated by Price Waterhouse.”151  The court reasoned that 
similar to an employer who discriminates against a female employee who 
does not wear dresses, an employer who “discriminate[s] against men 
because they do wear dresses and makeup . . . [is] also engaging in sex 
discrimination . . . [which] would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”152  
 
142  Id. at 1194. 
143  Id. at 1200. 
144  Id. at 1202. 
145  Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000). 
146  Id. at 1201; see also Norsworthy v. Beard, 74 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2014); 
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F. 3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011). 
147  Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F. 3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004). 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. at 576. 
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“[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is transsexual—and therefore fails 
to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from the 
discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in 
sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.”153 The Sixth Circuit 
opined that sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conformance 
is impermissible regardless of the reason for such behavior.154 
The framework established in Price Waterhouse and the resulting case 
law does not allow transgender plaintiffs to prevail on the grounds that they 
were discriminated against as transgender women or men. Rather, 
transgender plaintiffs prevail as gender non-conforming men or women. 
Under this framework, transgender individuals have a cause of action in 
court only if they “anchor” their claim in an outdated notion that there are 
only two biological sexes from which their behavior deviates.155 The courts 
following the footsteps of Price Waterhouse and Salem do not treat 
transgender status as a separate suspect class.156 
This problematic, narrow nature of Price Waterhouse’s framework is 
apparent in recent cases that refuse to recognize transgender individuals as a 
protected class because their claims do not fit an expected model. In 
Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh, Johnston brought an action under Title 
IX alleging that the defendants discriminated against him because of his sex 
and his transgender status by prohibiting him from using restrooms and 
locker rooms designed for men only.157  The district court found that the 
policy of segregating bathrooms by sex at birth did not violate Title IX 
because trans discrimination is not sex discrimination.158  The court rejected 
plaintiff’s arguments based on Smith v. City of Salem and the resulting case 
law reasoning that those cases do not treat transgender status in and of itself 
as a suspect classification, but only deal with sex and gender stereotyping 
discrimination claims, which Johnston failed to allege.159 
Similarly, in Etsitty v. Utah Authority, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals outright rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Title VII grants 
transsexuals protected status.160  Curiously enough, the court recognized the 
 
153  Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F. 3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004). 
154  Id. 
155  The fact that the court in Smith v. City of Salem continued to refer to Smith by male pronouns 
further showcases ignorance of some courts when it comes to understanding the biological and social 
reality behind transgenderism. See generally Smith, 378 F. 3d at 566. 
156  See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F. 3d 1312, 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Norsworthy v. Beard, 74 F. 
Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
157  Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 657 (W.D. 
Pa. 2015). 
158  Id. at 670. 
159  Id. 
160  Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F. 3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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scientific complexities behind sex and gender but declined to address them 
on the issue at hand.161  Instead, the court allowed the plaintiff’s alternative 
claim that she was a biological male who was discriminated against for 
gender non-conformity, but denied relief nonetheless.162  The court 
reasoned that as extensive as Price Waterhouse’s rationale might be, using 
a specific restroom does not constitute a failure to conform to sex 
stereotypes the way of dressing, acting, and talking does.163 
The shortcomings of Price Waterhouse as applied to transgender 
individuals should be obvious.  Protecting Hopkins’ refusal to conform to 
gender stereotypes and right to express herself at the workplace allowed 
other people to exist free of punishment for failure to act like their 
perceived sex. However, Hopkins’ actions did not require “reconsideration 
of the biological fundamentality of binary sex categories.”164  What 
Hopkins did was ask for equal treatment not hindered by archaic notions of 
how a woman or man should act.165  When transgender plaintiffs bring 
claims under the sex-stereotyping theory, their justice is hinged on their 
ability to argue that they are no different than Hopkins—a biological 
woman who identifies as a woman and has the right to express behaviors 
inconsistent with her sex.166  It is indeed a great irony that transgender 
people, who by their very existence invalidate the authority and validity of 
socially and medically-inscribed gender and sex categories, are forced to 
embrace them in order to get protection of the law. 
Moreover, the Price Waterhouse framework is unlikely to be 
applicable to solitary confinements in prisons. Most cases where 
transgender plaintiffs prevailed dealt with discrimination in the workplace 
where employers treated their transitioning workers with animosity for 
failing to conform to gender stereotypes of men and women.167  
Transgender inmates, on the other hand, get placed into administrative 






161  Id. at 1225. 
162  Id. at 1224. 
163  Id. 
164  Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender 
Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 101 (2008). 
165  Id. at 101. 
166  Id. 
167  See generally Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F. 3d 1312, 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of 
Salem, 378 F. 3d 566, 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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Schroer v. Billington: Salvation? 
 
Plaintiff Schroer applied for a position with the Congressional 
Research Service (“CRS”), for which she was highly qualified for.168  As a 
biological male, Schroer was diagnosed with GID and began her transition 
while she was in the hiring process.169 Upon receiving an offer with the 
CRS, Schroer explained to the CRS representative that she was receiving 
medical treatment for gender dysphoria, which required presenting herself 
as a female in every aspect of her life.  Schroer intended to do just that 
when she started working for CRS.170  Upon learning that, the 
representative withdrew her offer to hire Schroer, explaining that given the 
circumstances, Schroer would not be a good fit at CRS.171 Schroer filed a 
suit, alleging that CRS withdrew the offer either because (1) it perceived 
Schroer to be a man who did not conform with gender stereotypes 
associated with men or (2) it perceived Schroer to be a woman who did not 
conform with gender stereotypes associated with women in our society.172 
In his 2006 decision denying CRS’ motion to dismiss, Judge 
Robertson recognized that protection of masculine women and effeminate 
men under Price Waterhouse is “different, not in degree, but in kind” from 
protection of men and women who perceive themselves as someone other 
than their assigned sex at birth.173  Unlike the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, 
Schroer did not “wish to go against the gender grain, but with it.”174  
“Schroer . . . [did not seek] acceptance as a man with feminine traits. She 
[sought] to express her female identity, not as an effeminate male, but as a 
woman.”175 Judge Robertson’s explicit recognition that Schroer was a 
woman embraced the notion that transgender individuals belong to the sex 
with which they identify themselves. Judge Robertson concluded that CRS’ 
decision was not influenced by gender stereotypes, but by intolerance for 
those whose gender identity does not match their genitalia.176 
In a surprising move, Judge Robertson then held that while Schroer 
does not have a cause of action under Price Waterhouse, she is not 
precluded from protection under Title VII as a transsexual.177  In his 
 
168  Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (D.D.C. 2006). 
169  Id. at 205–06. 
170  Id. at 211. 
171  Id. at 223. 
172  Id. at 210. 
173  Id. at 210, 225. 
174  Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211 (D.D.C. 2006). 
175  Id. at 210–11, 232. 
176  Id. at 211. 
177  Id. 
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reasoning, Judge Robertson criticized one of the pre-Price Waterhouse 
seminal cases on transgender discrimination, Ulane v.  Eastern Airlines for 
its outdated and narrow reading of the word “sex” in Title VII.178  In Ulane, 
an MTF plaintiff (“Ulane”) was discharged by the airline company after 
undergoing sex-reassignment surgery.179  The district court decision, 
penned by Judge Grady, held that because “sex is not a cut-and-dried matter 
of chromosomes,” the term “sex” in Title VII extended to “sexual 
identity.”180 The term “sex” “literally and . . . scientifically” applies to 
transsexuals.181 The Seventh Circuit overruled the district court’s decision, 
relying on legislative history behind the passage of Title VII.182 According 
to the Seventh Circuit, the lack of legislative history supporting the “sex” 
amendment and its last minute addition to the bill demonstrated that 
Congress never considered nor intended for the word “sex” to apply to 
anything other than its ordinary meaning and does not extend to 
transsexuals.183  The court rationalized that if the airline perceived Ulane as 
a female and discriminated against her because she was a female, Ulane 
would have a cause of action under Title VII.184  However, the airline 
discriminated against Ulane because she was a transsexual individual—a 
class that does not enjoy the protections of Title VII.185 
Judge Robertson, noting that twenty years have passed since the 
decision in Ulane, reasoned that the Supreme Court decisions subsequent to 
Ulane “have applied Title VII in ways Congress could not have 
contemplated.”186 One stark example would be Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Inc., where Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous court 
that 
Male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was 
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned 
with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions 
often go beyond the principal evils, and it is ultimately the 
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of 
our legislators by which we are governed.187 
Robertson did not give much weight to legislative inaction to include 
 
178  Id. at 212, 233. 
179  Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984). 
180  Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 824 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
181  Id. at 825. 
182  Ulane, 742 F. 2d at 1085. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. at 1087. 
185  Id. 
186  Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 203 (D.D.C. 2006). 
187  Id. at 212. 
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or exclude discrimination based on sexual identity, reasoning that a forty-
year-old silence is just that—silence.188 Instead, he agreed with Judge 
Grady’s approach to treat transgender discrimination as sex discrimination, 
noting that such an approach is a “straightforward way to deal with the 
factual complexities that underlie human sexual identity. These 
complexities stem from real variations in how the different components of 
biological sexuality—chromosomal, gonadal, hormonal, and neurological—
interact with each other, and in turn, with social, psychological, and legal 
conceptions of gender.”189 
Judge Robertson revisited his decision in the 2008 opinion and came to 
the same conclusion. Judge Robertson analogized Schroer’s situation with 
an employee being discharged for converting from Christianity to 
Judaism.190 In that hypothetical, the employer’s bias towards “only 
converts” and not Christians or Jews would still be interpreted as 
discrimination because of religion.191 No courts would accept the notion 
that discrimination “because of religion” would not encompass religious 
converts.192 In cases of transgender discrimination, the courts continue to 
focus on the label “transsexual” and ignore the statutory language itself. 193 
In the three years that have passed since Judge Robertson denied CRS 
the motion to dismiss, CRS has unsuccessfully argued that transsexuals are 
not currently covered by Title VII because of the recent bills introduced to 
the House of Representatives to ban sexual orientation and gender 
discrimination in employment.194 Rather than interpreting the non-passage 
of the bills as a sign that Congress was content with a narrow interpretation 
of “sex,” Judge Robertson agreed with Schroer that non-passage might also 
indicate that the statute requires, not an amendment, but a proper 
interpretation.195 
 
Towards a More Expansive Approach to Sex and Gender 
 
Judge Robertson’s understanding of the distinction between gender 
non-conforming men and women, transgender individuals, and his 
recognition of the need to protect the latter is comforting.  However, it is 
unclear whether his decision called for a creation of a separate class under 
 
188  Id. 
189  Id. at 212–13. 
190  Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 304 (D.D.C. 2008). 
191  Id. at 305. 
192  Id. at 306. 
193  Id. 
194  Id. 
195  Id. at 308. 
06-FAROSHA 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/17  12:43 PM 
140 FIU Law Review [Vol. 12:117 
sex discrimination or for recognition that “sex” encompasses a population 
beyond “male” and “female.” If it is the former, there is a question of 
whether a separate class will even solve the problems transgender people 
deal with currently.  If Schroer establishes transsexuals as a third protected 
class, it will challenge the binary sex/gender system.  However, the third 
class will protect only people like Schroer, i.e. individuals diagnosed with 
GID, intending to undergo sex reassignment surgery.  Such classification 
will exclude many others who also fall under the “transgender umbrella” 
and experience discrimination across all areas of our society, from 
workplace to prisons.  Pre-operative transsexuals, transgenders, cross-
dressers, genderqueers, etc., are the ones who challenge the cissexist 
notions of sex and gender the most because they do not undergo medical 
procedures in order to present themselves as a man or a woman and are 
often more visible than “passing” post-op transsexuals.  Those people will 
still remain victimized by the justice system and society. 
There has been a push for creating a “gender identity” or “gender 
expression” class under sex discrimination in order to extend protection to 
not just “passing” post-operative transsexuals, but the rest of the persons 
under the “trans umbrella.” However, creating a “gender identity” class will 
essentially create a spectrum where every other identity falls someplace 
between the normative man and woman.  Like a “transsexual” category, a 
“gender fluid” category will continue perpetuating the binary sex/gender 
notions and “othering” individuals who are not female or male. 
It is more likely that Judge Robertson called for interpreting “sex” 
beyond male and female since he acknowledged that treating transgender 
discrimination as sex discrimination “was a straightforward way to deal 
with the factual complexities that underlie human sexual identity.”196 To 
avoid othering transgender and non-gender conforming individuals, while 
simultaneously challenging the binary sex system, a solution should consist 
of trans inclusivity to the level where trans individuals fit perfectly within 
the understanding of sex and gender; not occupy a small, capricious class 
where their existence is divided between two sides. Expanding the 
definition of “sex” in sex discrimination claims will include everyone who 
is being discriminated against based on their gender non-conforming 
appearance or identity.  The only way to achieve that is to do away with the 
sex/gender distinction and recognize that sex is not a rigid, biological 
process that results only in males and females. 
While society has come a long way to recognize the difference 
between gender and sex, the two are not as unrelated as they may seem.197 
 
196  Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008). 
197  See generally ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY 110 (2000). 
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“The biology of sex is ambiguous. Anything one says . . . about the biology 
of sex . . . is already mediated by specific models that have gender 
constructs built into them.”198 
[O]ur conception of sex is based on a lived biology which 
is constituted of our historical and cultural ideas.” 
Anthropological studies have showed us that the cultural 
processes which create different identities for men and 
women are different from society to society. Gender 
identities are thus not similar in every cultural system. But 
gender is influenced by sex and sex is influenced by 
gender.199 
It may be argued that gender is more rigid than sex.200 Transgender 
individuals have a firm understanding of their gender identity and who they 
wish to be; the only problem lies in their biological body that can be 
surgically and hormonally altered to match their identity.201 One might 
argue that despite undergoing sex-reassignment surgery and hormone 
treatments, transgender individuals are still “genetically male.” However, 
reliance on chromosomes, hormones, and internal and external sex 
characteristics further undermines the notion that sex is binary and rigid.202  
Where would the law and science place a male with XXY chromosomes 
who appears biologically male, but whose genetic map contains two female 
chromosomes?  Where would science place a non-operative transwoman, 
who has been on estrogen hormone treatment for years? Her genitals match 
a biological male but her hormones, which are just as much a part of her 
biological make-up as her genitalia, do not. 
Furthermore, gender is a product of brain function and the brain is just 
as biological and tangible as external and internal sex organs.  This begs the 
question—where and when does a person cease to be a member of one sex 
and become a member of the other? Courts across the country have yet to 
agree on a unified answer to this question. The attempt to answer this 






198  Kari Helene Partapuoli, Woman/Man as Cross Cultural Categories: The Sex/Gender 
Distinction With Reference To The So-called Third Sex, http://www.partapuoli.com/Texts/Gender_ 
third_sex.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2016). 
199  See id. 
200  Id. 
201  Id. 
202  FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 197, at 110. 
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Is One Born a Woman or Becomes One? 
 
The following analysis of case law differs from that in Part II because, 
rather than addressing whether transgender discrimination is sex 
discrimination, the cases below attempt to determine what makes a person 
“man” or “woman” in the eyes of the law. 
Until recently, courts around the country refused to recognize even 
post-operative transsexuals as men or women for the purposes of opposite 
sex marriage. In In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, an Ohio court 
considered whether a post-operative MTF was permitted to marry a male.203 
The court declined the marriage application, reasoning that, despite sex- 
reassignment surgery and successfully presenting as a woman, the applicant 
at birth possessed only male characteristics and there was no evidence that 
the applicant’s chromosomes were anything but male.204 The Supreme 
Court in Kansas used similar reasoning to void a marriage involving post-
operative male-to-female transsexual.205 The court reasoned that 
[t]he words “sex,” “male,” and “female” in everyday 
understanding do not encompass transsexuals. The plain, 
ordinary meaning of “persons of the opposite sex” 
contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and 
not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria. A 
male-to-female post-operative transsexual does not fit the 
definition of a female. The male organs have been 
removed, but the ability to “produce ova and bear 
offspring” does not and never did exist. There is no womb, 
cervix, or ovaries, nor is there any change in his 
chromosomes. As the Littleton court noted, the transsexual 
still “inhabits . . . a male body in all aspects other than what 
the physicians have supplied. J’Noel does not fit the 
common meaning of female. [citations omitted].206 
Similarly, in Kantaras v. Kantaras, the court held that a marriage 
between a “biological” woman and a post-operative female-to-male 
transsexual was void ab initio.207 The court, agreeing with the courts in 
Kansas and Ohio, reasoned that the common meaning of “male” and 
“female” in statutes governing marriage referred to immutable traits 
determined at birth.208 While acknowledging that advances in medical 
 
203  In re Ladrach, 513 N.E. 2d 828 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1987). 
204  Id. at 840. 
205  Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W. 3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
206  Id. at 228. 
207  Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
208  Id. at 158. 
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science might warrant a change in the common meaning of “male” and 
“female”, the court reserved the resolution of the issue to the legislature as a 
matter of public policy.209 
The courts’ refusal to see even post-operative transgender individuals 
as legally male or female for the purposes of opposite-sex marriage created 
an ironic loophole in the law. Their statutory interpretation of “man” and 
“woman” warrants a finding that the original sex at birth is the only 
determinative factor in the context of marriage. However, such logic also 
dictates that an individual born a woman, but who later transitioned into a 
man could technically marry another man despite the ban on same-sex 
marriage.210 
In contrast, a court in New Jersey recognized the validity of the 
marriage involving a male-to-female transsexual.211 The court reasoned that 
if an individual who underwent sex-reassignment surgery can function 
sexually as a female or male, there is “no legal barrier, cognizable social 
taboo, or reason grounded in public policy to prevent that person’s 
identification at least for purposes of marriage to the sex finally 
indicated.”212 
The disagreement between the courts in determining what makes 
someone a “man” or “woman” in the eyes of the law can be found in areas 
outside of marriage and public policy. A district court in D.C. recognized 
that a plaintiff, who underwent sex-reassignment surgery and became 
legally female, had a right not to be held in temporary custody with 
males.213  In Shaw v. District of Columbia, the defendants, police officers, 
claiming qualified immunity argued that the plaintiff’s Due Process right 
not to be held in temporary custody with males has not been clearly 
established in law.214 The court disagreed, emphasizing the significance of 
the plaintiff’s legal status as female.215 In explaining its reasoning, the court 
distinguished Shaw from a case in Arizona, where the plaintiff did not have 
a clearly established constitutional right to be housed in a women’s 
 
209  Id. at 160. 
210  The legalization of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), 
warrants a question whether courts that previously refused to consider MTF transgender people as 
women for purposes of opposite-sex marriage will reverse their stance. Courts’ reluctance to recognize 
transgender people as legal husbands or wives was understandable in the context of prohibition of same-
sex marriage but misguided. While sexual orientation and sexual identity are intimately intervened, they 
are distinct concepts. Declaring post-operative transgender individuals as legal wives or husbands would 
not equal to allowing same-sex marriage take place. 
211  M.T. v. J.T., 355 A. 2d 204 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
212  Id. at 88. 
213  Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F. Supp. 2d 43, 59 (D.D.C. 2013).  
214  Id. at 57.  
215  Id. 
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detention facility because she was not legally female.216 There, the plaintiff 
also identified as a transgender woman, had undergone surgical alterations 
to her body to appear more feminine, was taking hormones, but had not yet 
undergone sex-reassignment surgery.217  The Arizona court held that the 
plaintiff had not identified any legal authority holding that a transgender 
woman with intact “male” genitalia has a constitutional right to be housed 
in an immigration detention facility for females.218 
Upon examination of these cases, society’s obsession with genitalia 
and the notion that it dictates a person’s sex is apparent. The courts may 
disagree whether sex-reassignment surgery makes someone a man or a 
woman, but they do agree that external genitalia, whether “real” or 
achieved through surgery, is determinative of a person’s status as a man or 
a woman. Thus, an individual’s right to self-identify is ignored and 
completely depends on whether the court recognizes only the genitals the 
individual was born with. 
Courts that take into consideration only the birth sex and genetic 
structure of an individual place too much importance on the authenticity of 
chromosomes.219  It is impossible to know whether one is born with female 
or male chromosomes without testing to confirm their chromosomal 
authenticity.220  For most people, checking up on their chromosome 
configuration is hardly at the top of their list during annual check-ups, so it 
is likely that there are more individuals with ambiguous chromosomes than 
current statistics show.221 
Judith Butler’s suggestion that “bodies . . . only live within the 
productive constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory schemas . . .  
becomes more apparent in light of the process that takes place at 
childbirth.”222 Whenever an infant is born with ambiguous genitalia or a 
“micro-penis,” the gender and societal norms, not genetic make-up, 
determine the sex of an infant.223 Infants born with ambiguous genitalia are 
first subjected to genetic testing to determine their chromosome 
configuration.224 If the test results reveal an XX configuration, surgery is 
 
216  Id. (citing to Guzman-Martinez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV 11-02390-PHX-NVW, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97356 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2012)). 
217  Guzman-Martinez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97356, at *5. 
218  Id. at *25–*26. 
219  See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 33, at 63–64. 
220  Myra J. Hird, Gender’s Nature: Intersexuality, Transsexualism, and The ‘Sex’/‘Gender’ 
Binary, 1 FEMINIST THEORY 347, 353 (2000). 
221  Id. 
222  FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 197, at 75. 
223  Hird, supra note 220, at 353. 
224  Id. 
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performed to shape the infant’s genitalia into a vagina.225 If there is a XY 
configuration, doctors conduct more testing to see if genital tissue is 
responsive to androgen treatment, which aims to enlarge the genitalia so it 
could resemble an “actual” penis.226 If the treatment fails, the ambiguous 
genitals are transformed into a vagina and an infant with XY chromosomes 
is raised as a female, often unaware of the procedures that took place.227 
Surgeons aren’t very good at creating the big, strong penis 
they require men to have. If making a boy is hard, making a 
girl, the medical literature implies, is easy. Females don’t 
need anything built; they just need excess maleness 
subtracted. As one surgeon well known in this field 
quipped, “you can make a hole but you can’t build a 
pole.”228 
This shows not only that reliance on chromosomes can be misleading, 
but also how the actual sex of the infant is determined. The size of a 
prospective penis is used to decide the sex of an infant, not genetic make-
up.229 What constitutes an “appropriately sized penis” is not dictated by 
biology, but gender and societal expectations.230 Furthermore, gender traits 
and stereotypes are not similar in every cultural system. In some cultures, 
femininity is associated with power rather than submission and nurture. The 
reading of nature is done through sociocultural lenses—just as gender is 
sexed into masculine and feminine categories, sex is gendered into male and 
female categories. 
Discrimination against crossdressing men and transvestites is 
technically gender stereotype discrimination that is explicitly prohibited by 
Price Waterhouse, but crossdressers also fall under the transgender 
umbrella because they challenge the gender norm, go against the social 
grain, and cross gender boundaries, if only temporarily.  Is there a sincere 
need for a separate class if another alternative is to simply educate the 
masses that sex and gender is not black and white and the reading of the 
word “sex” should not be narrowed down to male and female? 
The courts’ lack of recognition of people who do not appear 
traditionally male or female, of people who do not identify as either, or 
people who self-identify as trans can be directly attributed to the sex-gender 
distinction. The application of Price Waterhouse to transgender 
discrimination cases is a prime example of this harmful distinction. Instead 
 
225  See id. at 361. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. at 364. 
228  FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 197, at 59. 
229  See id. at 59–60; see also Hird, supra note 220, at 351. 
230  Hird, supra note 220, at 351. 
06-FAROSHA 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/17  12:43 PM 
146 FIU Law Review [Vol. 12:117 
of allowing plaintiffs to self-identify and file claims as trans women being 
discriminated against because they are trans women, the Price Waterhouse 
framework only recognizes discrimination of a person who is biologically 
“X” but acts and behaves as “Y.”231 Schroer, on the other hand, embraced 
the notion that transgender individuals have a right to self-identify with the 
sex they want and rejected the practice of placing trans plaintiffs into the 
categories of the sex assigned to them at birth.232 Instead of perceiving 
Schroer as a male who underwent sex-reassignment because he identifies as 
a woman, Judge Robertson saw a woman who was being punished for 
taking steps to finally become comfortable with herself.  Robertson’s 
acceptance of Schroer’s claim that she is a woman subverted the approach 
of other courts viewing transwomen as women with male bodies. 
 
Does Law Imitate Life or Does Life Imitate Law? 
 
Interpretation of statutory language equips the judiciary with a 
powerful ability to define categories and decide which category a person 
belongs to. This ability was used to shape race relations in the United States 
since the days of slavery and continues to do so now.233  Modern battles 
over the interpretation of “sex” are reminiscent of forgotten and infamous 
precedents, such as deciding what makes someone “white” and “non-white” 
to deny people of color freedom or citizenship.234 
It has been long established that race is not rooted in biological reality, 
but is sociopolitical in nature.235  The notion that there is only one race, the 
human race, is cliché, but accurate.  Despite variances in hair and skin 
colors and the shape of one’s eyes, differences between individuals of the 
same race are often greater than the differences between the “average” 
individuals of different races.236  However, social constructions of racial 
categories have long been used as a means of achieving various social 
purposes.237 
In the United States, the categorization of people based on their race 
was created to enhance and solidify the socioeconomic institution of 
 
231  See Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 657 
(W.D. Pa. 2015). 
232  See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
233  Frank H. Wu, From Black to White and Back Again, White By Law: The Legal Construction 
of Whiteness, 3 ASIAN L.J. 185 (1996). 
234  Id. at 189. 
235  Luther Wright, Jr., Who’s Black, Who’s White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the 
United States’s Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REV. 513, 518 (1995). 
236  Id. at 523. 
237  Id. at 524. 
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slavery.238  The categories did not emerge from a vacuum, but were rather 
carefully created through law and pseudo “racial” science.239  The creation 
was indirect because early laws defined race in terms of blood or ancestry.  
Because both are not readily apparent to society, blood ancestry had to be 
inferred from physical appearance.240  This proved to be ineffective after an 
increase in biracial people, who could have passed as “white,” so the laws 
became more stringent.241  The end result was the famous “one-drop rule” 
that mandated placing everyone who has one drop of black blood into the 
black race category, regardless of their appearance.242 
In In re Ah Yup, a circuit court held that petitioner, a Chinese man, was 
not considered white, and was thus not eligible for naturalization.243  In his 
holding, the judge relied on the ordinary meaning of the word “white,” 
dictated by the “well settled meaning in common popular speech . . . [as 
understood] everywhere” in the United States.244  Similarly, a Japanese man 
in Ozawa was denied naturalization despite arguing that he was “white” 
within the meaning of the word because his skin color was actually white.245  
The Court, reverting to its “one-drop” rhetoric, held that skin color alone is 
not determinative of race.246  The Court rejected a literal statutory 
interpretation approach, focusing instead on the intent of the legislature and 
came to the conclusion that, by the words “white person,” the legislators 
only meant to include people of Caucasian decent.247  Ozawa, despite his 
fair complexion, fell under the Mongolian racial category.248 
The cases above represent only a small sample of case law that played 
a major role in crafting racial categories.  Nonetheless, they demonstrate 
that courts play an important role in creating and enforcing social categories 
through interpretation of statutory language.  Courts in the past assumed 
that they knew what it meant to be “white,” just like the courts now assume 
that they know what it means to be a man or a woman. Some courts, wary 
of defining “sex” broadly, reserved the right to do so for the legislature249 
and some relied on Congress’ inaction as indication that “sex” was intended 
 
238  Id. at 520–21. 
239  Id. at 545. 
240  Id. at 523–24. 
241  Wright, supra note 235, at 524. 
242  Id. 
243  Carrie Lynn H. Okizaki, “What are You?”: Hapa-Girl and Multiracial Identity, 71 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 463, 478 (2000). 
244  Id. 
245  Id. 
246  Id. 
247  Id. 
248  Id. 
249  Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F. 3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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to be read narrowly.250  However, as Schroer correctly pointed out, 
“Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several 
equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the 
inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered 
change.”251 
In addition, the argument that Congress never considered nor intended 
that the word “sex” apply to anything other than its ordinary meaning 
because it was a last-minute addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is 
moot.252  It may be argued that clinging to the ordinary meaning of “sex” is 
narrow-minded, since Congress did not contemplate what should be 
considered under “sex.”253 Moreover, as noted by Justice Scalia in Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the 
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils. . . .”254 Amending 
statutes that prohibit sex discrimination to include transgender 
discrimination is likely to turn out problematic in the future for reasons 
discussed throughout Part II.  Sex and gender do not exist in binaries; they 
extend beyond male and female, masculine and feminine. There are 
countless identities that do not fit into neat “transgender woman” and 
“transgender man” categories. “Othering” people who do not identify as a 




When an inmate is segregated, and placed into isolation, administrative 
or otherwise, solely because they are transgender, intersex, or gender 
nonconforming, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated. The courts must 
acknowledge transgender discrimination as sex discrimination and apply 
heightened scrutiny to determine whether such segregation furthers an 
important government interest in a way that is substantially related to that 
interest. 
The current transgender discrimination framework, under Price 
Waterhouse, will not work in the long term and does not work for trans 
inmates in solitary confinement.  The Price Waterhouse framework forces 
plaintiffs to file claims as non-gender conforming men or women, which 
essentially denies the very existence of trans people and genderqueer folk.  
Furthermore, the Price Waterhouse framework provides relief to 
 
250  Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
251  Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (quoting Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 
633 (1990)). 
252  Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086. 
          253      Id. 
   254      Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
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transgender plaintiffs that do not conform to gender stereotypes and exhibit 
behavior in conflict of their biological sex. Trans inmates, on the other 
hand, are placed into administrative segregation because of their status as 
transgender, often under misleading or unwarranted concern for their safety.  
To avoid othering transgender and non-gender conforming individuals, a 
solution should consist of trans inclusivity to the level where trans 
individuals fit perfectly within the understanding of sex and gender, and not 
occupy a small category where their existence is divided between two sides.  
Understanding that “sex” extends beyond “male” and “female” and 
recognizing that transgender discrimination is sex discrimination will do 
just that. 
To be clear, the assumption that trans women are vulnerable to attacks 
is not incorrect.  There are instances of trans women requesting to be placed 
into protective custody to protect themselves from harm and abuse. 
However, such requests, due to the psychological damage of isolation, 
abuse by the prison staff, and poor conditions of solitary confinement cells, 
are comparable to a trapped animal forced to chew off its own leg to escape 
and are hardly ideal. We must also provide trans inmates with an 
environment where they are not forced to subject themselves to complete 
isolation to survive. The prison system in the United States needs to 
develop more effective policies regarding housing transgender inmates, not 
leaving them with limited options of either remaining in the often-hostile 
general population or spending their incarceration period in isolation.  The 
desire to be free of harm and the desire to not be isolated from the 
population should not be mutually exclusive. 
The experience of gender is internal; it cannot be accurately 
determined by genitals or appearance. A prisoner’s self-identity should be 
the driving force behind housing assignment decisions. The housing 
policies instituted in the city of Denver have been largely successful, with 
the Department of Corrections recommending other jails and prisons across 
the United States to follow their model.  The most significant detail about 
the housing policies in Denver jails is the detainee’s agency and the right to 
self-identify.  Detainees in Denver jails are able to take private showers, 
request to be housed with other trans inmates, and request a male or female 
guard to perform strip searches.255 Furthermore, the incorporation of 
sensitivity training for the jail employees and education on the importance 
of gender identity and proper nouns256 may contribute to reducing staff 
violence against transgender inmates. 
However, Denver’s policy of automatically barring trans women with 
 
 255     See Brown, supra note 92. 
 256     Id. 
06-FAROSHA 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/17  12:43 PM 
150 FIU Law Review [Vol. 12:117 
records of sexual assault from being assigned to female housing units 
creates another pocket of prison population in need of proper assignment.  
An ideal solution would be to create a separate housing unit for transgender, 
intersex, or non-gender conforming prisoners who are somehow 
disqualified from being assigned into units matching their gender identity.  
Such housing must be carefully crafted to avoid further marginalization of 
transgender individuals.  Separate housing for non-gender conforming 
individuals will also provide protection to those who do not identify as 
transgender, but are at risk of being sexually assaulted or abused. 
The change will not happen overnight; it will not happen for many 
years to come.  The implementation of this framework must begin at the 
fundamental institutions of our society, such as schools and households.  It 
must begin with our children and the deconstruction of a notion that there is 
a huge difference between men and women.  This framework does not call 
for abolishment of sex categories, nor does it invalidate the reality and 
experiences of men and women.  What this framework does is challenge the 
binary sex hierarchy and provides a legal and societal space for those 
existing outside of it. 
 
